Bruce Schneier zum NSA-Skandal: "Die US-Regierung hat das Internet verraten" Security

Hallo,

am besten liest Du Dir das Originalinterview auf Englisch durch.
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-s ..)

Dort steht u.a.

"The NSA also devotes considerable resources to attacking endpoint computers. This kind of thing is done by its TAO – Tailored Access Operations – group. TAO has a menu of exploits it can serve up against your computer – whether you're running Windows, Mac OS, Linux, iOS, or something else – and a variety of tricks to get them on to your computer. Your anti-virus software won't detect them, and you'd have trouble finding them even if you knew where to look. These are hacker tools designed by hackers with an essentially unlimited budget. What I took away from reading the Snowden documents was that if the NSA wants in to your computer, it's in. Period.

[...]

With all this in mind, I have five pieces of advice:

1) Hide in the network. Implement hidden services. Use Tor to anonymize yourself. Yes, the NSA targets Tor users, but it's work for them. The less obvious you are, the safer you are.

2) Encrypt your communications. Use TLS. Use IPsec. Again, while it's true that the NSA targets encrypted connections – and it may have explicit exploits against these protocols – you're much better protected than if you communicate in the clear.

3) Assume that while your computer can be compromised, it would take work and risk on the part of the NSA – so it probably isn't. If you have something really important, use an air gap. Since I started working with the Snowden documents, I bought a new computer that has never been connected to the internet. If I want to transfer a file, I encrypt the file on the secure computer and walk it over to my internet computer, using a USB stick. To decrypt something, I reverse the process. This might not be bulletproof, but it's pretty good.

4) Be suspicious of commercial encryption software, especially from large vendors. My guess is that most encryption products from large US companies have NSA-friendly back doors, and many foreign ones probably do as well. It's prudent to assume that foreign products also have foreign-installed backdoors. Closed-source software is easier for the NSA to backdoor than open-source software. Systems relying on master secrets are vulnerable to the NSA, through either legal or more clandestine means.

5) Try to use public-domain encryption that has to be compatible with other implementations. For example, it's harder for the NSA to backdoor TLS than BitLocker, because any vendor's TLS has to be compatible with every other vendor's TLS, while BitLocker only has to be compatible with itself, giving the NSA a lot more freedom to make changes. And because BitLocker is proprietary, it's far less likely those changes will be discovered. Prefer symmetric cryptography over public-key cryptography. Prefer conventional discrete-log-based systems over elliptic-curve systems; the latter have constants that the NSA influences when they can."

Einige (Manche? Viele?) Hard- und Softwarehersteller bauen in Zusammenarbeit mit der NSA bewusst Sicherheitslücken in ihre Produkte ein. Aber ein Rechner, der nicht im Netz ist, kann auch nicht über das Netz angegriffen werden. Das ist der Grund, warum er zum 3. Schritt rät.

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http://www.theguardian.com/profile/bruceschneier

Gruß

... das Problem beginnt schon mit den Microcodes des Prozessors. Diese können schon beim Rechner Start durch das BIOS oder das Betriebssystem mit Schadcode kompromittiert werden. Sobald der Rechner also angeschaltet wird kann schon eine "Hintertür" offen sein.

Ich empfehle allen PC Nutzern im "Paranoia-Modus" einen alten 386er PC mit dem guten alten MS-DOS. (da ist man auch vor dem Internet sicher)

EDIT: ...oder man entwirft seine Bomben mit Stift und Papier.